The adverse effect of dummy auction bids on market value by Reed, Richard et al.
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Reed, Richard, Robinson, Jon and Williams, Peter 2002, The adverse effect of dummy 
auction bids on market value, Australian property journal, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 202-205.            
 




Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items 
included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by 
this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au 
 
Copyright : 2002, Australian Property Institute 
Dummy auction bids
Copyright of Full Text rests with the original
copyright owner and, except as pennitted under the
Copyright Act 1968, copying this copyright material
is prohibited without the pennission of the owner or
its exclusive licensee or agent or by way ofa licence
from Copyright Agency Limited. For infonnation
about such licences contact Copyright Agency
Limited on (02) 93947600 (ph) or (02) 93947601
(fax)
200208330
The adverse effect of dummy
auction bids on market value
By Richard Reed. Professor Jon Robinson. and Peter Williams
Abstract
The popularity of an auction as a means of selling residential real estate has increased
markedly in recent years. The effectiveness of an auction program is heavily promoted by
most real estate agents, claiming it to be the best means of attracting the best price from
the highest bidder, It is based on the theory of gathering all buyers together at a publicised
time, and then offering the property for sale to the open market.
In theory, the person most willing to buy the property will have the highest bid, supposedly
agreeing at market value with the vendor (although above the vendor's reserve I.
Unfortunately, the practice of dummy bidding has recently resurfaced and highlights serious
flaws in the auction system, with hundreds of residential auctions conducted across
Australia every weekend.
Clearly, it is in the vendor's best interests land the auctioneer's best interests, who is paid
even more by the vendor if the price is higherl to achieve the highest offer from the last
bidder. The tactic of dummy bids is designed to deceive genuine purchasers into a false
sense of perception, where there appears to be more competition for the property than
there actually exists.
This paper examines the auctio~ process with the emphasis placed on the practice of
dummy biding, It considers the broad implications for the definition of market value and
also the overall residential market. Useful advice is also included for real estate valuers
relying upon auction sale properties in their market analysis. As well as strongly supporting
the auction concept, the authors suggest improvements to the overall auction process to
ensure relevance to the definition of market value is maintained.
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rarely inspect other properties for sale in the
prevailing market, to the same level of detail
as a buyer would.
Therefore, if conducted and marketed
properly, an auction protects the interests of
the vendor in accordance to the definition of
market value. However, in reality, little
consideration has been given to the conduct
of auctions from the buyer's perspective, and
if it really is an arm's length open market sale.
Unfortunately, the practice of dummy bids
has again resurfaced in Melbourne, with little
evidence to suggest it has ever disappeared
completely. At times, dummy bidding is also
referred to as vendor bidding, and has been
part of the Melbourne real estate scene for 30
years (Bruce Bell as cited by Money, 2002).
This technique could cause the buyer to pay
an additional amount to buy the property
over and above the true market value, at
times competing with a bidder who is acting
on behalf of the auctioneer and has no
intention of actually buying the property.
Introduction
When called upon to investigate the
circumstances surrounding a sale, an auction
has been typically welcomed by valuers as an
arm's length open market sale and a viable
way to successfully complete real estate
exchanges (Sherman Cl Bussio, 1994),
The definition of market value for real estate
remains the focus of all real estate valuation
reports, and can be restated as "the estimated
amount an asset should exchange for on the
date of valuation between a willing buyer and
willing seller on the date of valuation after
proper marketing, wherein the parties acted
knowledgeably. prudently and without
compulsion" (IVSC, 200t).
The auction process overcomes many of the
problems that can be associated with this
definition of market value. For example, a
typical marketing period before an auction is
about four weeks and, coupled with an
advertising campaign and open inspections, is
normally considered an adequate length of
exposure for most residential properties.
So long as the auction is well attended by the
purchaser public, the final sale price is
supposedly set by the market, and not by the
vendor (Dotzour, Moorhead Cl Winkler, 1998).
Or is it? In other words, the use of an auction
sale has commonly been seen to overcome
many of the problems associated with vendor
knowledge, or their lack of knowledge about
the marketplace. For example, a vendor would
Background
The residential real estate market in
Melbourne is commonly referred to as the
auction capital of Australia, if not the world.
It has been estimated that approximately 75
per cent of residential properties in
Melbourne are sold through a planned
auction program, including a successful offer
before, during and after the auction date
(Ken man, 2002],
The balance is sold by private treaty using a
for sale price or through a tender process. It
is generally accepted in the marketplace that
most houses are sold by auction, and the
buyer market is well trained to attend
advertised open house inspections within the
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standard four-week marketing period.
Buyers gather outside the property just
before the publicised time, and then listen to
the auctioneer state the rights of the
auctioneer. Notably, the auctioneer reserves
the right to include or exclude any bids, and
to only sell the property if the price is
agreeable to the vendor, and also reaches or
approaches the reserve.
The reserve price, set by the vendor, is central
to the efforts of the auctioneer to reach the
highest price and facilitate a successful sale.
Unless the bids re~ch the reserve price, the
property is unlikely to be sold. Notably, the
reserve is set by the vendor and may be set at
a level higher than fair market value, creating
pressure on the auction process to achieve
high bids even before the auction starts.
Furthermore, the reserve itself can fluctuate
according to the state of the residential
market and its position in the real estate
cycle. For example, in a downswing scenario
there is a greater temptation to use a dummy
bidder to reach the reserve, which is
becoming harder to achieve. Some
forecasters are tipping a downswing in the
residential real estate market may be
imminent, and the use of dummy bidders may
support this view.
Clearly, in a market upswing the tactic of
dummy bidding is not required, as genuine
buyers follow a herd mentality and actively
compete with each other during the auction
without prompting. The skill of the auctioneer
to increase the size of the bids is clearly
evident at most auctions, ranging from
talking up the bidders with a raised voice, to
constant retreats into the house for supposed
vendor discussions. All are accepted tactics
used by the auctioneer in an effort to increase
buyer bids, and all buyers are fully aware and
anticipate such antics.
Even though there may be remedies under
the Trade Practices and Fair Trading Acts for
misrepresentation and misleading and
deceptive conduct, actually proving that
dummy bids are in breach of the Acts may be
difficult. However, the courts have implied
terms into contracts that a party should act
reasonably, fairly and in accordance with due
process.
For example, in the case of Hughes Aircraft
Systems International v Air Services Australia
(1997) the Federal Court decided that in a
tender process, a contract arose between the
organisation seeking tender offers and those
making them, and that the parties to that
contract should act reasonably, fairly and in
accordance with due process. Similarities can
be drawn between this case and the
relationship between an auctioneer and the
highest bidder.
In other words, this case has identified that
the relationship between an auctioneer and
highest bidder may give rise to a contract.
Accordingly, it is an implied term of this
contract that the parties would act
reasonably, fairly and in accordance with due
process. It follows on that a dummy bidder
may be breaching this term although is yet to
be fully tested in the Australian legal system.
Review of literature
As anticipated, a global literature search
revealed either little or no research had been
conducted on the effect of dummy bidding
on final sale values, obviously because of the
difficulties associated with defining and
measuring the effects of this secretive, but
accepted practice. Previous researchers have
studied the auction process, with the
emphasis placed on highlighting differences
between the final sale price of an auction sale
in contrast to the final sale price of an open
market sale (or a 'for sale' property advertised
as a set asking price). Interesting results were
produced for both techniques and are
discussed further below.
The overall trend indicates that an auction of
a residential property would produce a higher
transfer price than if a conventional open
market sale process was used. Previous
studies conducted in Australia suggested a
premium of about three per cent up to as
much 15 per cent (Lusht, 1990) (Newell,
Macfarlane, lusht Et Bulloch, 1993, as cited by
Dotzour et aI., 1998). A Melbourne study
using house sales data from 1988 and 1989
concluded that a vendor would achieve an
additional 5.5 per cent by auctioning rather
than selling (Lusht, 1990).
However, there were no valid reasons offered
to explain this premium. ~Whi/e differences in
market conditions con explain variations in
the auction discount they cannot explain why
auctioned property should ever sell at a
premium" (Lusht, 1996 as cited by Mayer,
1998, p.42). While an auction conducted
under must sell circumstances (e.g.
mortgagee in possession) would place
downward pressure on the final sale price, a
higher sale price produced by an auction
requires additional analysis.
It has been argued that an auction benefits
the real estate industry and the buyer at an
auction is placed at a clear disadvantage in an
Dummy auction bids
auction process (Mayer, 1989 as cited by
Dotzour et al., 1998). with seemingly little
control over the auction proceedings and the
bidding process. This may be true in some
respects, and could encourage the use of
tactics such as dummy bidding to inflate the
price. Seemingly impossible to measure,
perha.ps the extent of dummy bidding at
auctions is more prevalent than estimated.
,
\
Dummy bids in the auction process
Often considered a common practice in
residential auctions, the use of a dummy
bidder has received increasing attention in
recent times. However, employing this tactic
can have an adverse affect on the mechanics
of the auction process and the final sale price.
This technique may involve the prior
agreement of a bidder attending the auction,
being a trusted friend or associate of either
the vendor or auctioneer. During the auction
this person is actively involved in the bidding
process and the auctioneer accepts these
false bids are a genuine effort to successfully
buy the property.
However, the d~mmy bidder has no intention
whatsoever of actually buying the property,
fully intending to withdraw from the bidding
process before the final bid is given. If the
dummy bidder is unexpectedly the last b'ldder,
the auctioneer has the publicised right not to
accept that bid, and can take the bid from the
second highest bidder.
Overall, there are three main tactics employed
by a dummy bidder. These are:
1. To start the bidding at a higher
opening bid
It is common knowledge that a group of
buyers will run out of steam if the
opening bid is too low, as prices tend to
increase as the auction progresses (Alien
Et Swisher, 2000). If relatively small
monetary increments are used (as
dictated by the buyers, where the
auctioneer is reluctant to discard any
bid), it may take too long for the bidders
to reach the reserve. In each buyer's
mind remains the thought that someone
viewed this property as only worth a low
amount (i.e. the opening bid). However,
the role of the dummy bidder in this
tactic is to start with a high bid,
positioned just below the reserve. This
may give the false impression that the
property is worth more (rather than
less), and gets the bidding process off to
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figure 1- [fleet 01 dummy bids on the auclion proms
Number of buyers willing to buy property
(C) New inflatedI market value
----------------- ---------------- -----------~-- J- ~~~:;r~~~o
----------- ------------------------ ------- ---- 'dummy' bids
"" (A) True
market value
The legal framework surrounding auctions
requires urgent attention to ensure this form
of deceit is .not continued. This legislation
should be enacted using a range of tough
fines, including loss of auctioneer's licence for
the proven use of dummy bidders in an
auc~ion process.
Suggestion 3
The relevant industry associations continue to
actively support the eradication of dummy
bidders from auctions by inclusion in their
codes of ethics, and enforcement thereof. For
example, members found to have violated
this code of ethics should be publicly named
and heavily fined individually, with a similar
action taken against the real estate
organisation within which they are employed.
Conclusion
true arm's length buyers and do not have
hidden interests in the auction process.
Suggestion 1
Auctions have always been promoted as a
tried and proven method of achieving the
highest sale price for a property. It gathers
together prospective purchasers in one place
at one point in time and sells the property to
the highest bidder. The evidence has
suggested that auctions generally achieve a
higher final transfer price than an open
market sale. Even though both approaches
are applied in the same marketplace within
the definition of market value, there have
been no valid reasons to explain this
difference.
One practice that has been openly
acknowledged is the practice of dummy
There are a number of steps that could be
taken to remove the deceit caused by dummy
bids. Although these suggestions will address
some of the problems associated with this
practice, the enforcement of these
suggestions may prove to be difficult.
falsely inflating the fair market value of a
property in an auction scenario. The true
market value (or worth) should be recorded at
point [A), where the property buyer and seller
are fully aware of all the circumstances
surrounding the sale, including the true state
of the market and the actual demand for the
property (Sherman et aI., 1994).
However, the use of a dummy bidderls
deceptively increases the number of buyers in
the marketplace, as indicated by (B) in Figure
1. This false market now creates more
demand and a higher market value for the
property, at times substantially above the true
fair market value, shown as new inflated
market value [or price) at (C).
In many instances a final successful bidder
can be competing with a dummy bidder, and
otherwise would not have bid higher against
their own bid (if the dummy bidder did not
participate in the auction). The end result
would be variation between agreed sale price
at the auction, and the actual true market
worth of the property.
Suggested amendments
to the auction process
The auctioneer, vendor and other parties with
a financial interest in the sale must declare
their relationship with any parties attending
the auction. This would ensure the bidders are
Suggestion 1
a competitive start.
3. Actively compete in the bidding
process to reach the highest price
after meeting reserve
It is only the highly experienced dummy
bidders who are able to master this skill,
and not end up over-cooking the sale.
Although the goal for the genuine bidder
is to have the highest, last and therefore
successful bid, they have competed in
the bidding process with the dummy
bidder who withdraws from the auction
having had the second last live bid.
The above techniques are three of the most
common employed by a dummy bidder. The
auction process protects their true identity,
with only the final successful bidder required
to disclose their name. The dummy bidder can
melt into the crowd, having created the
perception of a false market for the property.
2. Actively compete in the bidding
process to reach reserve
Unless the bidding reaches the reserve
price (set by the vendor), the house will
probably not sell at the auction.
Therefore, the dummy bidder has a set
monetary amount to bid up to, but not
exceed. This tactic is successfully
employed if there is only one serious
bidder at the auction, who would be
unwise to bid against their own bid. The
dummy bidder will push the serious
purchaser up to the reserve price, and
then withdraw. If there is no serious
competition and the reserve price is not
achieved, the auctioneer passes in the
property and it remains unsold. The
dummy bidder then has the first right of
refusal, although the target buyers for
salespeople in this example would be the
second highest bidder. The salespeople
from the real estate agents often then
speak to all the bidders individually at
the end of the auction, which also covers
the genuine bidder who reneges at the
last moment before the property reaches
the reserve.
There is little doubt that the general
definition of market value, with the emphasis
placed on the measure of anxious buyer and
anxious seller in the relationship, would be
adversely affected by the use of a dummy
bidder. Reference to Figure 1 clearly shows
the effect that a dummy bidder could have on
The effect of dummy bidding on
market value.
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bidders, which may partly explain this
premium. The use of dummy bidders by the
vendor and/or auctioneer could have the
effect of distorting the true market value,
designed to deceive the purchasing public
into competing at an inflated price in the
auction process.
It appears that the genuine popularity and
reputation of the auction process is seriously
threatened by the deceitful use of dummy
bidders. Steps must be taken to eradicate the
tactic before the entire residential auction
industry is discredited, and the level playing
field must be returned for the vendor,
auctioneer and the bidders alike.
Potential improvements to the auction
industry to discourage this practice could
include strong fines to both the individual
auctioneer and their employer, with
endorsement of the fines by the relevant
industry body. Not until after the successful
eradication of the dummy bid and associated
deceitful practices (e.g. two-tier marketing)
will buyers and vendors be able to confidently
trade in a fair and equitable marketplace.
Only then will valuers be able to rely on true
market value sales with a higher level of
confidence.
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New health insurance olferfor API members
For some time the Australian Property Institute has been seeking partnerships with external providers that will deliver benefits to Institute
members,
The Institute has selected Manchester Unity as'its pref~rred health cover partner. As ~ member-focused organisation, Manchester Unity
was established over 160 years ago and _remains oneof·the best proyiders-of value-for-money health cover in Australia, no matter your
I~mg~ • . . .... ..
As a result, the Institute has been' able to negoti;te e'xtremely' competitive rates for members by fo'rming an alliance'with Manchester Unity
that will deHvet: . ~; -' -.,-' . . ' .',
'" ',l.
• "special rates for APl.,members;
j'. ..•. gener~us'Hospitaland Extras oenetlts; '. -.
I '. .:-. \' _," .• '~: . !. '"
r • medical gap cover with participating doctors; . . .. , .
• :,no'~aiting fo.' be~efits that 'us~aIIY require two months' ~e~bers~ip"; "
• involuntary unemployment and accident insurance;
• benefits for sporting equipment ary~ fitness-related fees;
• health managementbenefits; '-.,.:
• loyalty rewards for members;
• continuity on most benefits when you transfer to the same level of cover from another registered health fund'; and
• extensive private hospital and day'surgery contracting throughout Australia.
"Knowing you and 'Your family will be covered in the event of a hospital admission should not be the only reason you consider health
insurance. You can also claim for pote!1tially costly treatments such as-physiotherapy, dental, Chiropractic, podiatry, natural therapies and
other extras services that are not covered by Medicare.
Manchester Unity's health cover options have been designed to provide you with a comprehensive choice of Hospital and Extras cover, with
prices to suit all budgets and life stages_ .
If you change your mind and cancel your membership within the first 30 days, Manchester Unity will refund your contributions less any
claims made.
For more information on Manchester Unity health cover, contact Ran Svoboda, telephone (02) 6248 6226 or 0417 233 612.
"Reduced waiting periods do not apply to pre-existing ailments, illnesses or conditions, obstetric conditions, or benefits that have longer
waiting periods. This offer is only available on a combined hospital and extras product.
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